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Abstract
NATO has survived until its 70th anniversary, essentially in the same condi-
tion as practically every year of its existence. According to commentators and 
external experts, the Alliance seems to be in a constant crisis, and every new 
version of the crisis is seen as final and deadly. By contrast, for those who are 
active internally, NATO seems stronger than ever before - it is engaging in 
more places than ever before, presenting new initiatives at an unprecedented 
pace and in ever-longer summit declarations. The problem situation present-
ed in this way allows us to formulate the main research problem: What role 
does NATO play in shaping the global security system? The research problem 
formulated in this way consists of detailed problems formulated in the form 
of questions: 1) What are the current challenges for NATO? 2) What are the 
current threats to NATO? 3) What is Donald Trump's policy towards NATO? 
The aim of the presentation is to present an analysis of the role of NATO in 
ensuring collective security in the context of the 70th anniversary of the found-
ing of the organization. The research process uses methodological methods of 
scientific cognition, mainly analysis and criticism of literature.
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Introduction
NATO has survived until its 70th anniversary, essentially in the same condition 
as practically every year of its existence. According to commentators and ex-
ternal experts, the Alliance seems to be in a constant crisis and every new ver-
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sion of the crisis is seen as final and deadly. By contrast, for those who are ac-
tive internally, NATO seems stronger than ever before - it is engaging in more 
places than ever before, presenting new initiatives at an unprecedented pace 
and in ever-longer summit declarations. Now that the Alliance has returned 
to its inherent collective defence mission its future has long since seemed so 
secure. This dichotomy will undoubtedly lead to a debate that will be reminis-
cent of what the Alliance experienced when it celebrated its 40th, 50th, and 60th 
anniversary. There will be those who highlight the factors that cause divisions 
while others will highlight what unites. Some will analyse global strategic trends 
and argue that the Atlantic is expanding and the days when Europe could rely 
on North America are gone. Others will see the worsening security conditions 
and the rise in the power of anti-liberal authoritarian leaders as factors pushing 
transatlantic partners to work together as they represent a shrinking part of the 
world's population and economic power (URL1). Some will be convinced that 
NATO is a victim of history and the pressure exerted on multilateralism and 
an on international order based on recognised principles. Others will see the 
Alliance as a valuable barrier against these destructive forces and as a guaran-
tee that liberal democracies can still emerge from this clash with a defensive 
hand. The 21st century is a turbulent century characterised by competition of 
the great powers, rising military spending and a willingness to use the threat 
of force, rapid and far-reaching technological innovations that put greater, de-
structive potential in the hands of more potential villains; and a series of hybrid 
actions aimed at dividing and destabilising Western societies and influencing 
their political and economic systems. More than in the past, Alliance members 
face challenges from within and outside its borders, from multiple directions at 
the same time. Death from a thousand minor injuries may not seem as horrible 
as sudden death, but the effect remains the same. The problem presented in this 
way allows us to formulate the main research problem: What role does NATO 
play in shaping the global security system? The research problem formulated 
in this way consists of detailed problems formulated in the form of questions: 
1) What are the current challenges for NATO? 2) What are the current threats 
to NATO? 3) What is Donald Trump's policy towards NATO? The presentation 
aims to show an analysis of the role of NATO in ensuring collective security 
in the context of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the organization. The 
research process uses methodological methods of scientific cognition, mainly 
analysis and criticism of literature.
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Challenges 
For most of the past decades, NATO has been in a relatively luxurious position 
because it has had to face one challenge at a time and place. On its 40th anniver-
sary, the Alliance focused solely on changes to the USSR. The 50th anniversary 
coincided with the air campaign in Kosovo, and the 60th anniversary was domi-
nated by discussions about the leapfrogging increase in the number of forces in 
Afghanistan. However, this time it is different. NATO is in its seventies and has to 
deal not with one but three strategic fronts, not only geographically differentiat-
ed, but also with different types of threats and responses. In the East, a resurgent 
and aggressive Russia has raised the pressure in the Alliance's eastern Member 
States and the situation demands that the Alliance - after a break of almost 30 
years - be capable of deterring, defending and defeating an equal opponent with 
a modernised armed force, rich military experience and technically advanced 
weapons (URL2). In the South, fragile states are vulnerable to extremism, militias 
and criminal gangs, which pose a whole range of security threats, from terrorist 
attacks to humanitarian crises and uncontrolled migrations. These problems re-
quire regional knowledge, development, and long-term capacity-building part-
nerships involving a wide range of actors. At home, we see the polarisation of 
many Western societies that are struggling to control the dependencies created 
by globalisation. Moreover, the all-encompassing technologies have given sinis-
ter actors a new set of hybrid tools to spread confusion or influence. These chal-
lenges hit Alliance members in different combinations and come from different 
sources. However, all members expect NATO to listen equally to their individ-
ual concerns and provide solutions. What is therefore unique about the current 
situation of the Alliance, what is that it threatens to get out of control? One of 
the problems is strategic overload. Another is that poorly solved domestic cri-
ses or the inability to create a barrier against provocations such as cyberattacks 
or chemical attacks below the threshold of Article 5 (NATO collective defence) 
could encourage opponents to make territorial demands as well. Equally, allow-
ing these opponents to trample human rights and sow corruption and bad govern-
ance in the South - all in the name of restoring order - could encourage them to 
try the same tactics in the eastern neighbourhood of the Alliance. Therefore, for 
the first time in seven decades, NATO must deter and defend itself against both 
internal and external enemies. As we have seen since the terrorist attacks on the 
United States on 11 September 2001, from now on, Article 5 could be applied 
much more to threats to transport, power supply infrastructure, satellite commu-
nications, pipelines, IT networks and civilians sitting on park benches than to 
tanks crossing borders. Solidarity will no longer be a rare requirement waiting for 
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a potentially catastrophic but extremely unlikely armed blurred message. Rather, 
it will be an almost daily necessity in response to provocations that do not pose 
an existential threat, but which cannot be tolerated by civilised societies. This is 
a fundamentally new and extremely urgent issue that Alliance leaders must de-
bate if they want NATO to have a future at least if as in the past. How, instead of 
preparing for one type of attack, can the Alliance make its Member States (and 
some key partner countries) fully resilient and capable of responding effectively 
to the 21st century model of excessive interference and ubiquitous competition?
This does not mean that the topics that dominate NATO's current political ac-
tivities are not relevant. Burden-sharing is at the heart of the US President Don-
ald Trump's concept of the Alliance's usefulness to the US, and any future US 
administration - whether republican or democratic - is likely to insist on this as 
well. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defence of the democrat administration, gave 
a speech in Brussels in 2011, its sharpness, and the emphasis on the urgency of 
European capability shortages was a harbinger of the rhetoric of the Republican 
Trump, half a decade before the latter entered the White House. The participation 
of the United States in burden-sharing of the of collective defence and, more re-
cently, Article 5 operations outside NATO have always been disproportionate and 
unfair. Europe's prolonged dependence on the United States was one of the main 
reasons why some US senators wanted to limit the duration of the NATO Treaty 
to just ten years when it was presented for ratification in 1949. Europeans have 
constantly promised to eliminate this discrepancy in a series of burden-sharing 
and balancing initiatives, but they have not done so. As Europe became wealth-
ier and wealthier, aspired to equal treatment on the global stage, its inability and 
unwillingness to put money into its defence became increasingly incomprehen-
sible. So, instead of being the most reluctant to return to the debate on burden 
sharing, Europeans should perhaps congratulate themselves on being so lucky 
that Canada and the United States were willing to insure Europe's defence during 
peacetime longer than any of the founding fathers of NATO would have thought 
possible - and desirable. Europeans simply need to increase their defence budg-
ets to two percent of GDP, not because the United States is demanding this as a 
precondition for maintaining NATO, but because Europeans are living in an in-
creasingly difficult and threatening neighbourhood. Under these conditions, these 
two percent will provide Europeans with the necessary capabilities so that they 
do not have to make difficult choices between deterring Russia and fighting ex-
tremism in the Sahel, or put a high-ready division above the development of more 
powerful cybersecurity and research into the emerging areas of artificial intelli-
gence, robotics and hypersonic missiles (URL3). Now that the Defence Invest-
ment Commitment of the Alliance Summit in Wales has stopped the decline in 
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defence spending and brought about a real increase in it, Alliance members must 
unequivocally sustain these efforts. However, they also need to develop a nar-
rative to explain the relationship between money, capabilities and security. The 
figures in the media may seem a little arbitrary. An additional USD 100 billion 
by 2020 is a large amount, but NATO must show the public what this means in 
terms of real improvements in equipment, readiness and training. It also needs to 
focus more on the achievements of individual countries. Ability to combat threats 
such as cyber-attacks, armed disruptions to space capabilities, terrorism, border 
security, data manipulation, protection of critical infrastructure and supply chains 
and humanitarian crises caused by extreme weather events may be more in line 
with public expectations than traditional military assets such as tanks and artil-
lery. This should encourage NATO planners to take a broader view of capabili-
ty requirements. Two percent of GDP should be a target for both the European 
Union and NATO . If the United States were to turn its back on NATO one day 
or limit its involvement to territorial collective defence against Russia, two per-
cent should be the minimum that would guarantee European strategic autonomy 
(URL4). Consequently, the Defence Investment Commitment should progres-
sively evolve from efforts largely enforced by the United States to actions that 
Europeans will demand of each other. On the other hand, NATO's function is not 
primarily to ensure justice - equal benefits for equal contributions. Achievements, 
i.e. the benefits of membership, will always be more important than investments. 
Individual investments must contribute as much as possible to our common suc-
cess. The diversity of Alliance members (large and small, with different resources 
and influence networks) means that they will always contribute in different ways 
to the common goal. The role of NATO must be to promote activities and to find 
ways of combining different contributions in order to achieve maximum strate-
gic impact. This is more effective than formulating guidelines for standard con-
tributions, which could make NATO too strong in some domains and too weak in 
others. When NATO takes on the challenges of the 21st century, it can be argued 
that a broad and diverse spectrum of multiple resources, skills and knowledge 
and capabilities will give the Alliance an advantage over its opponents. I see four 
areas where the Alliance must become a better playmaker.
Threats
First, we need to intensify the inter-agency dialogue. China, for example, will 
have a much greater influence on international relations in the 21st century 
than Russia and will exert that influence in a very different way. China is al-
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ready leading the way in setting technological trends in artificial intelligence 
and bioengineering, as well as in 5G connectivity, which will be the corner-
stone of the Internet of Things. They are increasing their investments in Africa, 
Europe, and the Middle East and sending more soldiers to UN peacekeeping 
missions. Even now, those NATO members are discussing the advisability of 
allowing Huawei to join their IT networks, they can see that China can divide 
them up while Russia, in general, usually unites them. Since the 'Chinese mod-
el' will be the main competitor of liberal democracy, the key question will be: 
how will Alliance members deal with China? The point is not to see China as 
another military challenge, but to best understand the country and involve it in 
joint action. Perhaps the time has come to set up a NATO-China Council or, at 
the very least, to have a strategic dialogue. In the past, cooperation in the are-
as of the joint fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and assistance to the UN 
and the African Union in capacity building have shown the potential of NA-
TO-China relations (Burles – Shulsky, 2000). To begin with, NATO should ap-
point some prominent diplomats or officials to focus on China and establish 
a network with the Chinese People's Liberation Army and civilian leadership. 
Apart from China, other key issues must be more systematically addressed by 
the Alliance. For example, although NATO is developing its space policy, the 
Alliance has still not declared that space is an operational area, nor has it looked 
at the seriously growing dependence of navigation, time calibration, tracking 
and target-setting on space assets. Yet 58 countries have put satellites in orbit 
and most of the space-based services on which NATO depends have a dual-use 
(civil/commercial and military). The development of missile defence, hyper-
sonic missiles, drones and data processing, not to mention early warning and 
cyber-security capabilities, will all make competition in space more competi-
tive. Satellites will be more vulnerable to manipulation, disruption, and destruc-
tion, and conflict resolution will increasingly depend on who makes better use 
of space. That is why the United States has recently established a Space Force 
and is planning to establish a space command.
Other issues that need attention are Russia's role in exerting influence outside 
Europe, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, and the emerging impor-
tance of entities such as India and Saudi Arabia. But not only traditional states 
with traditional potentials are changing the nature of security. Equally impor-
tant are the issues that need to be addressed: How will the decisions of large 
technology companies shape and control the future of the internet and social 
interaction? How will ISIS/Daesh be regrouped and how will it define a new 
business model for the post-caliphate? Or how does organised crime weaken 
governments and fuel corruption?
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NATO cannot rely on rare ministerial meetings or occasional briefings pre-
sented by national diplomats passing through Brussels. Recent crises like the 
one between India and Pakistan in Kashmir show how quickly events can get 
out of control and have global consequences. NATO needs to think about how 
to better match its situational awareness and consultation mechanisms to rap-
idly changing and unpredictable security conditions. The alliance should not 
be considered solely as an organisation dealing with a limited set of issues in 
a narrow way, and only in its immediate neighbourhood. The second area in 
which the Alliance must improve its performance is the deterrence of threats 
below the threshold of Article 5. Hybrid warfare is complicated because the 
boundary between what is legal and what is illegal is thin. When do normal 
business transactions become a form of hostile state interference? How can we 
stop our opponents from using technology we have created against us? Some 
commentators have declared that deterrence cannot be effective against hybrid 
threats because they are multifaceted and simply reveal the polarities and divi-
sions that are already so prevalent in our societies.
There is certainly no easy and immediate solution that would allow effective 
deterrence in a hybrid area such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons to neu-
tralize an opponent's nuclear potential. Indeed, the first step is to deter by ne-
gating the benefits or depriving the opponent of the fruits of aggression through 
immunity and rapid regeneration of potential. However, the reaction to Russia's 
chemical attack in Salisbury last year showed a whole range of other steps that 
could be taken. The perpetrators have been identified and condemned through 
the disclosure of intelligence material, and a large number of Russian diplomats 
have been expelled in a coordinated manner. NATO and the European Union 
have united their actions and the two organisations have undertaken to analyse 
their preparedness and resources to respond to chemical and biological attacks.
Will NATO survive Donald Trump's policy?
Donald Trump has not spared critisism of NATO. It is also a common belief 
that the sudden abandonment of allies in Syria speaks volumes about the situ-
ation of US allies around the world. In NATO in particular. We know for sure 
that Donald Trump spoke publicly about NATO, that it is 'obsolete', and that 
he has quietly, at least several times, raised with his colleagues the issue of the 
possible departure of the US from the Alliance (URL5). This will probably not 
happen formally - the president's view that the Alliance is unnecessary for the 
USA, and few people, apart from him, share it in Washington. However, we are 
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undoubtedly witnessing the weakening and unsealing of NATO. The majority 
of Europe and America are parting more and more quickly. Today, this is the 
biggest problem of international politics in the West. For countries such as Po-
land, which are medium-sized but have an extremely difficult geography, this 
is a fundamental problem. There is a conviction in Europe that we are protected 
from catastrophe by the fact that the President of the United States does not de-
cide on foreign policy alone (URL6). It is true that not many of the people who 
today co-decide on the policy of the superpower would, like President Trump, 
say that Europe is an 'enemy'. However, more of them do not like Europe, al-
most all of them do. Naturally, the Americans are right in their criticism of Eu-
rope. Most European governments spend too little on defence, others, like the 
PIS government, hide their expenditure on roads and VIP aircraft in their mil-
itary budgets. Not all allies are in solidarity - Germany, for example, is open-
ly flirting with Russia over the Nord Stream II gas pipeline or the Italians and 
Hungarians. However, America also often, or rather more often, does not show 
solidarity, and for Trump, moreover, it shows solidarity on a particularly regu-
lar basis. Suffice it to mention the unilateral withdrawal from the USA and Eu-
rope's agreement with Iran.
It is the  USA, that is Trump, who disregards above all the foundations of NATO, 
that is to say, the common values. The preamble to the Washington Treaty states 
that members are to protect 'a common heritage and civilisation based on the 
principles of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law'. The current 
US Government does not pay attention to this. Turkey is sometimes less criti-
cised than the European Union or Germany. The criticism of Law and Justice 
is not about rules, but only about matters that America cares about: disputes 
with Israel or attacks on TVN (owned by a company from the USA). This is 
the case with everything: Trump's America treats everyone, including its allies, 
exclusively in terms of narrow interests and even trade: you can give, you will 
get something. He does not see that the advantage of the USA and the whole 
West in the world, starting from the Second World War, consisted of something 
else: politics based on common principles (even if sometimes bent) and work-
ing out unity (even if difficult). After the initial shock, the majority of Europe 
developed a two-track ̒  Trump strategy’. First, to get along in those fields where 
possible - either with the president himself or, more often, with his environment 
and other members of the government. The same game is played by the Law and 
Justice government, for example in talks on increasing the presence of Amer-
ican troops in Poland. Secondly, the response of the EU or countries such as 
France, Germany, or Scandinavia is stronger intra-European coordination and 
seeking closer ties with third partners such as Canada, Australia, or Japan. Our 
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government is doing the opposite - it is throwing itself into the arms of Trump’s 
America with everything and unconditionally, as evidenced by the last anti-Ira-
nian conference in Warsaw. A characteristic - and sad - style of the world's reac-
tion to America's new, selfish as never before, policy is also characteristic. It is 
not only the Polish President (ʻ Fort Trump’), but also larger partners - for ex-
ample Emmanuel Macron - who tried this tactic without success. Recently the 
Prime Minister of Japan shocked the whole country and half of the world when 
a hidden message leaked that Trump had nominated him for the Nobel Peace 
Prize. It is even more interesting in Washington, D.C. itself. Professionals who 
have sometimes told him the unpleasant truth are disappearing from the envi-
ronment of the US President, and those who have no problem with flattery are 
doing well. In his speech in Munich, Vice-President Pence mentioned Trump 
over 30 times. This is much more than the deputy of the Chinese First Secretary 
Xi Jinping mentioned in his speech in Munich. How will the West differ from 
the East - Putin's or Chinese - if it is governed by the same poor, sometimes 
embarrassing rules? Exaggerated? Perhaps. But what if the extravagant pres-
ident has been ruling the White House for not two but six more years? Trump 
has, yes, a record-breaking unpopularity in the US. But its political opponents, 
the Democrats, have no one who would be more popular (URL7).
Conclusions
In conclusion, deterrence can be gradually built against hybrid campaigns by 
credibly identifying, naming, and condemning the perpetrators. Through pro-
portionate responses that do not escalate but show that hybrid attacks will be 
consistently resisted in a collective and coordinated way. It is also important to 
identify and remove weak elements in NATO's critical infrastructure spectrum, 
both materially and virtually. These reactions will include trial and error phases 
when the Alliance checks what will best encourage the opponent to rethink their 
intentions. They will also require the creation of a common catalogue of meas-
ures - both existing and new - and a knowledge of how they can be applied in 
a targeted way against both the states and the pawns they are using.  The daily 
image of NATO - which deploys new forces in its eastern Member States, or-
ganises powerful exercises, fights cyber threats and terrorism, conducts training 
and capacity-building missions in places such as Afghanistan or Iraq and wel-
comes new members - will be in startling contrast to the political and academ-
ic rhetoric that presents NATO as obsolete and its members as a burden on low 
return assets. In a word, optimists will not see the need to reform the Alliance, 
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and pessimists will see that reforming the Alliance is not possible. As has of-
ten been the case in history, this will boil down to a choice between deeds and 
words and a discussion about what is most decisive for NATO's credibility in 
the long term. If the glass is half-full and half-empty, both sides are right, and 
we are not moving forward. However, to repeat this somewhat fruitless discus-
sion on NATO's 70th anniversary would be a waste of opportunity - perhaps 
even a historical mistake. Extreme opinions that everything is fine or nothing 
is fine with NATO to distort reality and do not reflect the essence of the matter. 
Indeed, the Alliance is not doing so badly if we take into account the criticism 
and doubts that hit so many other institutional pillars of the post-war interna-
tional order. It is not difficult to find good news about NATO, and impressive 
concrete achievements overshadow the frustrations of the last two summits. 
Overall, they show how great the commitment of 29 members to NATO is still 
expressed in the financial expenses, capabilities, and sacrifice of the soldiers, 
as well as in the speeches. However, without falling into shallow patterns that 
prophesy the crisis, we must also face the fact that the Alliance is now operat-
ing under the most complex security conditions it has ever faced in its history. 
It is facing, more than ever, a diverse range of threats. Of course, they may not 
be as extreme as the nuclear holocaust during the Cold War, but they are never-
theless acute and uncontrollable, they can bring to an end liberal societies and 
individual freedoms that are now taken for granted by the citizens of the nations. 
Above all, NATO will have to develop a culture of permanent readiness, reliable 
intelligence, and the ability to make a whole lot of small decisions regularly and 
quickly, rather than great decisions being made rarely and too late. However, 
if NATO can operate more effectively below the threshold of Article 5, it will 
be less likely that it will have to face threats above that threshold in the future.
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